feat(platform): forward protected requests to run
This commit is contained in:
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Runtime distribution and client-manager APIs require the current bearer session,
|
||||
|
||||
## Private Run Dependency And Update Routes
|
||||
|
||||
The following signed routes are Run-only and never part of browser/plugin DTOs: `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/dependency-input`, `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/update-input`, `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/update-chunk`, and `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/update-health`. They require the current endpoint/session signature; input/chunk calls additionally require active attempt/lease/cancel fencing. Update chunks are bounded to 1 MiB and resolve only an available same-server target-matched Run distribution. Health reports are accepted only after the terminal staged job, matching attempt/lease proof, current online endpoint release, and reconciliation-capable session are verified. These routes never return raw artifact paths, browser download tokens, host paths, credentials, secret refs, or session/lease hashes.
|
||||
The following signed routes are Run-only and never part of browser/plugin DTOs: `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/dependency-input`, `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/protected-request-input`, `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/update-input`, `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/update-chunk`, and `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/update-health`. They require the current endpoint/session signature; input/chunk calls additionally require active attempt/lease/cancel fencing. Protected-request input additionally requires the current fencing token and returns approved text exactly once for the server-bound logical transport; the text is not persisted in a job, bridge command, journal, response projection, or audit summary. Update chunks are bounded to 1 MiB and resolve only an available same-server target-matched Run distribution. Health reports are accepted only after the terminal staged job, matching attempt/lease proof, current online endpoint release, and reconciliation-capable session are verified. These routes never return raw artifact paths, browser download tokens, host paths, credentials, secret refs, or session/lease hashes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Implemented Run Control Actions
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ Control is the highest-priority run-facing channel; artifact/file transfer press
|
||||
- `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/result`: accept `RunJobResultRequest` and write an idempotent terminal result or durable retry-wait transition with capped exponential backoff.
|
||||
- `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/cancel`: accept fenced `RunJobCancelPollRequest` and return durable pending cancellation intent for the current attempt.
|
||||
- `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/reconcile`: accept persisted Run journal evidence (`jobId`, `attempt`, `leaseToken`), rebind only matching active attempts to the current authenticated session generation, persist reconciliation metadata, retry/cancel platform-active missing work, and return confirmed assignments plus discard IDs.
|
||||
- `POST /api/v1/run/jobs/protected-request-input`: accept `ProtectedRequestExecutionInputRequest`, fence endpoint/session/attempt/lease/token, and return one approved, unexpired SQL, RCON, or management-program request only for its exact server-bound logical transport. The route never returns credentials, DSNs, paths, sockets, raw connections, or host shell material.
|
||||
- `POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/cancel`: authorize the server owner/administrator or platform administrator and durably record cancellation intent; queued/retrying work becomes cancelled immediately while active work completes through fenced Run polling/result.
|
||||
|
||||
Run job actions carry bounded job metadata only: job ID, run endpoint ID, server instance ID, capability, idempotency key, lease token, attempt/retry limits, deadlines, progress, terminal state, message, error code, result reference, and timing hints. Raw lease tokens exist only on the signed Run job channel; platform persistence stores their hashes. User-facing Job responses expose safe attempt, retry, cancel, terminal, and reconcile projections but never raw/hashed leases, Run sessions, secret refs, host paths, sockets, or credentials.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user